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Wiener, Jason M. M A , May 2005  Philosophy
Conditions for the  Justifiability of Copyright in Novel Expressions 
Chairperson: Tom H u f f ^ ^ \ \ ^
Copyright is a form  of intellectual property, which is a form  of property generally. The 
norm ative justification for copyright m ust be considered, therefore, against the background  
of the  general Justification for property. Lawrence Becker, in his book Property Rights: 
Philosophic Foundations, outlines argum ents from  three types of general Justifications for 
property rights -  utility, labor and political liberty -  and then a num ber of argum ents for 
these  rights. This paper, drawing on the  lines of reasoning established by Becker, seeks to  
tes t th e  existing Justifications for copyright against Justifications for property generally in 
order to  establish the basis for and scope of property rights in novel expressions.
W hile it is feasib le  to Justify som e form  of copyright th a t conform s to each of the lines of 
Justification considered. United States copyright fails  with respect to each because of its 
broad scope and lengthy duration. Under the  utilitarian Justification, copyright is offered in 
exchange for a m ore robust creative sphere: instead, it has resulted in artificial scarcity 
because of its pernicious effects on the structure of cultural production. Under the labor- 
desert Justification, copyright is som etim es a fitting benefit for the  value created by labor 
expended generating novel expressions but United S tates copyright fails to conform to the  
proportionality and appropriateness criteria th a t are e lem ents of the labor-desert 
Justification. Under the political liberty Justification, copyright is understood as derivative of 
an existing system of political liberty to which its enforcem ent must not be hostile; given 
changes in the  technology of cultural production, the  enforcem ent of United States copyright 
requires abridging political liberties constitutive of copyright. Bringing existing copyright law  
into com pliance with sound and valid Justifications for property rights generally will require 
reducing copyright’s duration, narrowing its scope, and broadening compulsory licensing 
provisions tha t uncouple com pensation from control.
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Once I’ve m ade the  music then it tends to disappear. 
It sort of stands up and starts to  walk away from  you 
by itself and has its own sort of life because when it 
starts to  becom e im portant to  other people, have  
significance to other people - and they all give it their 
own significances, they all give it their own realities - 
then at th a t point, to a certain extent, it becom es  
theirs and not yours.
- M ark  Knopfler
III
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Introduction
Copyright is a form of intellectual property, which, in turn, is a form of property 
generally. The norm ative justification for copyright m ust be considered, therefore, against 
th e  background of the  general justification for property. These general justifications for 
property are not settled but have been established along several lines of reasoning drawn 
from  the  history of philosophy.
Lawrence Becker, in his book Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations, gathered the  
best am ong these argum ents and collated them  into a s ta tem ent of the  plurality of 
som etim es conflicting and som etim es cohering justifications for property. He outlines  
argum ents from three types of general justifications for property rights -  labor, utility and  
political liberty -  and then a num ber of argum ents for these rights. Becker's intent is to 
carefully consider general justifications for and argum ents against property rights, largely 
leaving open specific questions about the sorts of rights th a t ought to be allowed, the scope 
of those rights and what sort of entities ought to bear property rights with respect to what 
kinds of property.
This paper, drawing on the lines of reasoning established by Becker, seeks to  test the  
existing justifications for copyright against justifications for property generally in order to 
establish th e  basis for and scope of property rights in novel expressions.
I. Copyright Distinguished from  other Forms o f Intellectual Property
Copyright is the right to copy -  or to prevent copying. Copyright operates by granting  
a lim ited monopoly over sale and publication of novel expressions to a creator or her 
assignees. Copyright, however is jus t one form  of intellectual property and needs to  be 
distinguished from  several others.
The m ost sim ilar of these other form s o f intellectual property is th e  patent. Patents  
are  intellectual property in inventions; they grant inventors exclusive control over an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
invention for a  lim ited term ; in the United States, the m axim um  life of an un renewed patent 
is tw enty years. However, patents differ significantly from  copyright because patents cover 
th e  ideas em bodied in an invention, while copyright purports to cover only the expression  
itself.
Tradem arks and service m arks are other form s o f intellectual property som etim es  
confused with copyright. Tradem arks are symbols or stylized texts used to  identify a product 
by its brand nam e; service m arks cover services rather than products. Each lasts for a 
lim ited term  but m ay be renewed as long as the m ark m eets  the  criteria for registration.
Trade secrets are a final form  of intellectual property, covering nonpublic information integral 
to  a business. Trade secrets are not registered and are covered by s ta te  law to varying 
degrees rather than by a  uniform federal law.
Each of these form s of intellectual property has a purported rationale. For 
tradem arks  and service m arks, the rationale is consum er protection; when som eone  
purchases a product with a recognizable brand nam e, he or she can be sure that th e  product 
is the  sam e as others labeled under the  sam e m ark. This rationale is fairly distinct from  the  
rationale for copyright. Patents, though, are  justified under a rationale analogous to 
copyrights; in fact, the authority for the United States Congress to grant patents and  
copyrights is granted in the  sam e clause of the  Constitution: Article I, Section 8 , Clause 8 .
The basic rationale for patents and  copyrights is th a t insufficient incentive exists for 
invention and expression w ithout the assignm ent of a  property right in the  results of th e  
productive process. The insufficiency of th e  incentive results from  th e  non-rivalrous nature  
of ideas and expressions, the  item s th a t can be classified as intellectual property. In 
contrast, traditional property rights cover rivalrous goods, goods th a t cannot be used by two  
people sim ultaneously without one use dim inishing another. For exam ple, in order to  use a 
law nm ower, I need exclusive possession of it; anyone who a ttem pts  to  use the law nm ow er at 
th e  sam e tim e is a rival for disposition of th e  law nm ower. This characteristic  of tangible
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
property, rivalrousness, lends itself much more agreeably to the  notion that, in order for any 
person to  use som ething, only one person can use it.
Non-rivalrous goods, on the  other hand, have a natural sta tus as som ething that can 
be acquired and used by m any people without being possessed or consum ed by any one of 
th em . Because non-rivalrous goods can be proliferated without dim inishing the potential for 
use by the proliferator, non-rivalrous goods are not subject to natural scarcity. Therefore, In 
th e  words of Thom as Jefferson, once an idea is released to the  public “it forces itself into the  
possession of everyone, and the  receiver cannot dispose him self of it." i Because of this, the  
justification goes, the  creator of a novel expression or the inventor of a new device cannot 
expect robust com pensation for generating novelty: once an idea or expression is first 
divulged, there is no need for any user to  return to  the source to get use of it. Therefore  
insufficient incentive to  undertake the  process of innovation exists in the absence of control 
over the proliferation of ideas and expressions once divulged.
Copyright and patents are intended as a rem edy for this. Their respective operations, 
however, differ with respect to scope and duration in significant ways. Patents are  broad and  
exhaustive, covering the ideas used in som e device or process; the ir term  is sharply limited, 
currently to a m axim um  of tw enty years. Copyright is intended to be narrower, protecting only 
novel expressions while allowing the  underlying ideas to proliferate freely; the  term  of 
copyright, however, is much longer than  patents, currently lasting the lifetim e of the  author 
plus seventy years or ninety-five years from  publication in the case o f a corporate copyright. 
The scope and duration of patents present interesting questions, som e along the  sam e lines 
of analysis as those raised by copyright, however this essay, now th a t copyright has been 
clearly distinguished form  patents, will set aside patents and focus exclusively on copyrights.
1 Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Monticello, August 13 ,181 3  in The \A/ritings of Thomas 
Jefferson, 13:326-38. quoted in Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights a n d  Copywrongs: The Rise o f  
In tellectual Property an d  How  It Threatens Creativity  (New York: New York University Press, 
2 0 0 3 ) , 2 3 .
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11. The Idea-Expression Dichotomy
The differential protections afforded by patents and copyright rely on a distinction  
between ideas and expressions. This notion of a dichotom y between ideas and expressions 
is fundam enta l to copyright law, which does not m ean it is not problem atic. Paul Goldstein, 
in Copyright’s Highway, describes the idea-expression dichotom y as a safety  valve em bedded  
in copyright tha t protects "the taproot of all creativity” fo r "were one to  protect plots with 
copyright, th a t would effectively stop a lm ost everyone from  writing novels or m aking  
movies."2 Goldstein is highlighting the  fac t tha t creativity requires raw m aterial for its 
com position and pointing to  the  idea-expression dichotomy as preserving a healthy com m ons  
of ideas while allowing private control of particular expressions.
A concrete illustration of the idea-expression dichotom y in action will both 
dem onstrate its practical utility while opening the increasingly difficult problem  of its 
application. Jam es Joyce borrowed freely from  The Odyssey while writing Ulysses but the  
works have a d ifferent status under copyright law. The Odyssey (though not any recent 
translation of it) is part of the  public dom ain and may serve as raw m ateria l for any sort of 
expression. Ulysses, in contrast, is protected by a copyright held and vigorously enforced by 
Jam es Joyce’s estate . Am erican film m akers  Joel and Ethan Coen also extensively borrowed 
from  The Odyssey to  craft the  plot for th e  film 0  Brother, W here Art Thou?  and Jam es Joyce’s 
estate  had no claim for infringem ent o f the  copyright on Ulysses because the ideas and the  
expression of The Odyssey received no protection when Joyce drew upon them . But both the  
Joyce estate and the  Coen brothers would have a claim for infringem ent on anyone who used 
elem ents  from  those expressions in som e other work. Oliver W endell Holm es tried to  
capture the  essence o f the expression half of the idea-expression dichotom y as follows:
2 Goldstein, Paul, Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press. 2003), 14.
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The copy is th e  personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality 
always contains som ething unique. It expresses its singularity even in 
handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it som ething irreducible, 
which is one m an's alone. That som ething he m ay copyright.^
W hile this distinction betw een ideas and expressions is useful in understanding the  
operation of copyright law, it is not particularly sound. Derivative works illustrate the  issue. 
Both Ulysses and 0  Brother, W here Art Thou are derivatives of The Odyssey but, since The 
Odyssey is in the public dom ain, neither derivative presents a question for copyright. If, 
however, som eone were to m ake a movie based on Ulysses, th a t m ovie would be an  
infringem ent on th e  copyright held by James Joyce’s estate. Clearly, th e  claim  of 
infringem ent upon the protected expression would be reasonable to the  extent th a t dialogue 
or som e other specific arrangem ent of words was taken  from the  novel.
But a  movie th a t set the  book in a d ifferent city but structured a sim ilar plot with 
sim ilar characters would also be an infringem ent, even if nothing of the expression of the  
book was expressly cribbed. In fact, the  current tes t for infringem ent by a derivative work, 
established in Sid & M arty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. M cDonald's Corp,^ is an  
am orphous “total concept and fe e l” standard th a t clearly covers m ore than the expression  
strictly construed. The trea tm en t of derivative works a ttem pts to  preserve th e  economic use 
of an expression from  one m edium  in other m edium s but, in the  process, blurs th e  distinction 
betw een expressions and ideas by providing protection to som e ideas, a lbe it those closely 
related to an identifiable expression.
The idea-expression dichotomy is a fundam ental e lem en t of copyright law but, as is 
apparent, it is not com pletely unproblem atic. Copyright purports to  protect the  public 
in terest in free  circulation of ideas while offering a moral basis for establishing property in
3 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 250 (1903)
« Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp, 562 F.2d 1157 (1977)
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the  public resources relied upon by creators as their raw m aterial, but it is based upon a 
distinction th a t is not strictly respected in practice. As a key to the  operation of copyright, the  
distinction between ideas and expressions is som ething to which this essay will repeatedly  
return. Though the idea-expression dichotomy is a  critical e lem ent of understanding  
copyright, th e  history o f copyright encom passes much m ore than m erely th e  idea-expression 
dichotomy.
III. A Brief History of the  Developm ent of Copyright Under United S tates  Law
United S tates copyright law descends from  the  S tatu te  of Anne, enacted in England 
in 1 7 0 9 . The S tatute of Anne is often credited as the  first copyright law, however th e  roots of 
copyright in England extend considerably further back in tim e than the  s ta tu te ’s 
im plem entation . M em bers of the book trade first developed the concept of copyright as a 
m ethod of protecting their interest as publishers’ in preventing the piracy of printed 
m aterials, doing so during the  years preceding the trad e ’s 1 5 5 7  charter of incorporation, 
which created the S tationers’ Company.^ Complicity in the  censorship exercised by the  
Crown during the 16^^ and 1 7 “' centuries perm itted the stationers to develop copyright 
w ithout interference from  interests outside the  trade. Therefore, copyright originated not as 
a property right for authors, as it is currently conceived, but for the  publishers who created  
the rules. The S tatu te  of Anne, which established the  first statutory copyright, developed out 
of a desire to control the  bookselling industry. Specifically, the  monopoly exercised by the  
booksellers had becom e increasingly unpopular, and Parliam ent sought to break it.
In th e  Statute  o f Anne, passed in 1 7 0 9 , Parliam ent provided a statutory copyright 
based upon the  stationers’ copyright, with two m ajor changes. First, th e  term  of copyright 
was lim ited to  twenty-one years for new works and twenty-one years from  th e  passage of the
5 Patterson, Lyman Ray. Copyright in Historical Perspective. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. 
1968, 4.
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sta tu te  fo r works already covered by a copyright: second, copyrights no longer needed to be 
held by m em bers of th e  Stationers’ Company.® Instantiating th e  existing stationers’ 
copyrights in a s tatu te  served to reduce the scope of copyright because all th e  works covered 
by th e  existing com pany copyright would becom e part of the  public dom ain once the twenty- 
one year period expired. The lim itation of the  term  of copyright was a move to reduce the  
power of publishers, whose perpetual ownership of copyrights was an irritant to the  British 
public.^ Further, allowing anyone to register a copyright m eant th a t piracy prevention moved 
from  being a private sanction of the Stationers’ Com pany to a public function, which 
essentially opened bookselling to  anyone with m aterial to publish and the m eans to do so.
By lim iting the  term  of copyright and breaking the  booksellers’ monopoly, the Statute of Anne 
dem onstrated Parliam ent’s intent to foster greater dissem ination of ideas rather than  ensure  
control over expression on behalf of copyright holders. This logic of promoting novel 
expression, rather than the notion of protecting author’s rights, served as the basis for Anglo- 
Am erican copyright a t its inception.
Copyright was an uncontroversial e lem ent of the US Constitution which, in Article I, 
Section viii. C lause 8 , grants Congress the power “to prom ote the  progress of science and 
useful arts, by securing for lim ited tim es to authors and inventors the  exclusive right to  their 
respective writings and discoveries.” The wording of the clause dem onstrates the  
instrum ental nature of copyright, by subsum ing the  actual power exercised by Congress -  
“securing exclusive rights" -  under the  direction of a specific end -  “promotion of learning” -  
and by lim iting th e  m ethod -  “a grant of exclusivity” -  to a lim ited term .
United S ta tes  copyright law developed through a series of s tatutes beginning with the  
Copyright Act of 1 7 9 0 , which provided protection for “m aps, charts and books” and under 
which a copyright could be obtained for a term  o f fourteen years, renew able for another
6 Ibid., 143. 
r Ibid., 146.
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fourteen  by the author or his “executors, adm inistrators or assigns."® The first m ajor revision 
of copyright law occurred in 1 8 3 1  when protection was extended to  musical compositions, 
the term  of copyright was lengthened to twenty-eight years renew able for fourteen and a 
living w idow or child was perm itted to renew the term.® Throughout the  rem ainder of the  1 9 ‘  ̂
century, copyright was defined mostly by the courts rather than  the legislature. Further 
legislative action occurred in 1 8 7 0  when the  class of derivative works was created to 
broaden the  scope of copyright protection in order to prevent the translation of novels 
w ithout a  grant of copyright from the author. 1 9 0 9  witnessed a m ajor revision of copyright 
law and introduced a longer term  for copyright -  now twenty-eight years renewable for 
twenty-eight more -  as well as a broader scope. The 1 9 0 9  bill broadened the scope of 
copyright by including m echanical reproductions of music and introducing the  “work for h ire” 
doctrine, which allows corporations to  claim  authorship of works produced under contract.
Copyright existed in uneasy balance with rapidly evolving technology for producing 
and distributing novel expression until a full-fledged rewrite of copyright cam e about in 1 9 7 6 . 
The current regime of copyright enshrined in United S tates law basically results from the  
1 9 7 6  Copyright Act and two pieces of legislation from  1 9 9 8 , the  Sonny Bono Copyright Term  
Extension Act and th e  Digital M illennium  Copyright Act.
Several significant changes m ade to the  law m ade by the 1 9 7 6  Copyright Act bear on 
the  norm ative basis for copyright. First, statutory copyright a fter 1 9 7 6  no longer relies on 
publication or restoration for the  acquisition of a copyright; copyright is autom atic  when a 
work is “fixed in a tang ib le  m edium  of expression."i° W ith this, copyright becam e a right of 
the creator by virtue o f the  creative process rather than a privilege of monopoly granted when
8 1 Stat. 124, quoted Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 197.
9 Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, 201.
10 17 use 102.
8
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a creator releases a work to  th e  public as an incentive for tha t release, underm ining the  
original intent of copyright and Its Constitutional basis. The Act also grants a long list of 
exclusive controls to the owner of a copyright in 17  DSC 1 0 6 , which include all rights of 
publication, derivation, presentation, display and transm ission. Finally, and m ost tellingly, 
th e  duration of copyright was extended to the  life of th e  author plus fifty years or seventy-five  
years from  publication for a corporate copyright. Essentially, copyright a fter the 1 9 7 6  Act 
becam e primarily a m eans to com pensate a creator and her heirs rather than a m echanism  
for granting the  public access to  new work.
Nonetheless, there are concessions in the  US Code to the original conception of 
copyright as a publicly granted privilege. 1 7  USC 1 0 2 b  asserts, “In no case does copyright 
protection for an original work of authorship extend to  any idea, procedure, process, system, 
m ethod of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the  form  in which it is 
described, explained, illustrated, or em bodied in such work.” This clause is a nod to  the  
idea/expression dichotomy but the  “total concept and feel" test of Krofft, which underm ined  
the  distinction, cam e just a year a fter the  1 9 7 6  Copyright Act was passed. Similarly, 1 7  USC 
1 0 7  allows fa ir use exem ptions to  copyright; these exceptions are designed to prevent the  
use of copyright as a regime for control by carving out exceptions for “criticism, com m ent, 
news reporting, teaching (including m ultiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research." The fa ir use exem ption does serve the Constitutional directive to prom ote  
learning by carving out specific exceptions for teaching, scholarship and research. This 
exception is a narrow construal of learning and th e  useful arts, however, and, as an elem ent 
of the  com plete regim e of copyright, serves more to restrict th e  scope of m aterial available  
for recom bination by future creators than fostering th a t creation.
In 1 9 9 8 , legislation prom oted by industries th a t rely on copyright for their business  
model further broadened the  scope and lengthened the  duration of copyright, in abrogation  
of its original purpose of prom oting expression. The first of these, the 1 9 9 8  Copyright Term
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Extension Act, extended the  term  of all new and existing copyrights by tw enty years, 
prom pted by, depending on who you ask, the EU’s directive to m em bers to establish a 
copyright lasting the life of the author plus seventy years or the  pending 2 0 0 3  expiration of 
Disney’s copyright on M ickey Mouse. Either way, it is difficult to see how Congress's action  
does anything to prom ote learning or stim ulate creativity. Rather, the  CTEA’s effect was to  
ensure continued com pensation to holders of copyrights on already existing works. This 
move com es at the expense of works th a t might use existing expressions in order to 
construct new expressions.
The second significant piece of 1 9 9 8  legislation related to copyright was the  Digital 
M illennium  Copyright Act, designed by current copyright holders to strengthen their ability to  
use technology to prevent violations of copyright. On this score, the most significant portion 
of the DMCA is the prohibition, in Section 1 0 3 , of any a ttem p t to circum vent electronic  
content controls. This prohibition m akes copyright enforcem ent the dom ain o f content 
com panies by perm itting content control a t  the source and deferring to  th a t control as a rule. 
The DMCA also creates a "safe harbor" for Internet Service Providers in Section 2 0 1 , a 
provision th a t effectively m eans th a t copyright holders can bully ISPs into removing content 
by issuing letters threatening lawsuits. The DMCA orders ISPs to comply with the dem ands of 
copyright holders, including removing content and providing the nam es of copyright infringers 
when subpoenaed by copyright holders. Furtherm ore, the  DMCA abrogates any responsibility 
of the ISP to those whose content may be rem oved a t the behest of copyright holders by 
absolving the  ISP of any liability for rem oving content regardless of the  content’s actual 
status. In effect. Sections 1 0 3  and 2 0 1  give copyright holders the power to enforce  
copyright privately with secondary recourse to crim inal procedures for anyone who a ttem pts  
to circum vent the privately installed and enforced controls.
The legislative developm ent of United S tates copyright law over the  previous thirty  
years exem plifies the continually increasing scope and duration of copyright tha t has
10
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characterized copyright's history since its m odern beginning in the  S tatu te  of Anne. 
Contem porary copyright law, th e  end result of a legislative process captured by copyright 
holders, describes the  copyright with which the logic of property rights in general m ust be 
squared.
IV. Goals and Methodology
The philosophical inquiries th a t m ake up the rest of this paper take  up this task, 
attem pting  to  square the  norm ative justification implied by the institutionalized political 
m orality of copyright with the norm ative justification for property generally. In doing so, 
B ecker’s lines of justification for property rights will serve as starting points for forays into the  
specific area of copyright. The investigation will begin by considering the  soundness of the  
utilitarian justification of copyright then proceed to the justifications from labor and political 
liberty. Considering the coherence am ong and conflicts between the  d ifferent lines of 
justification will lead to a conclusion about the scope and duration of copyright justified as a 
form  of property.
11
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The Utilitarian Justification of Copyright 
Although it is only one am ong several lines of justification for property rights, 
utilitarian logic was originally the m otivating principle behind United S ta tes  copyright law, 
which provides a good reason to begin an analysis of the  Justification for copyright 
specifically with this line of the general Justification for property.
Lawrence Becker, in Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations, m akes the utilitarian  
argum ent for property rights generally. His argum ent for the  utility of property rights is that 
one of those institutions th a t is required to facilitate hum an happiness serves a hum an need 
to acquire, use, possess and consum e things and th a t this need can only be ordered under a 
system o f property rights. If this claim about human personality holds, it raises the  issue of 
w hat types of things should be allowed as property and w hat the  nature of property rights 
ought to  be, both issues tha t are im portant to  the  question of copyright.
An application of Becker's general Justification of property to  th e  case of copyright 
specifically would involve asserting th a t people who create novel expressions need an  
exclusive right to prevent others from  copying those expressions in order to develop a 
reasonable expectation of satisfaction from  undertaking the activity in th e  first instance. This 
prem ise is analogous to the  claim  tha t, in the absence of copyright, creators will lack the  
incentive to produce novelty because those expressions will not be as likely to garner 
financial com pensation. There are two suppositions of this analogous claim  regarding 
copyright -  the presum ptive scarcity of expression in the  absence of guarantees of exclusivity 
and the efficacy of copyright as m ethod for alleviating th a t scarcity -  th a t will be 
problem atized during the application of Becker's general Justification o f property rights to  the  
specific case of copyright.
12
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I. The Application of Becker’s General Argument to the Specific Case of Copyright
Becker’s argum ent from  utility for the general justification of property rights (57 -5 8 )  
begins with the  assertion (a) tha t institutions are needed for a reasonable degree of 
happiness to  result from  individuals Joined in society, and, further, (b) som e institutions are  
not m erely convenient or effic ient but necessary to  foster a reasonable degree o f happiness. 
From this assertion follows the requirem ent (c) th a t necessary institutions be specifically  
identified based on the  requirem ents of the society in question and (d) the  character of the  
institutions be defined according to  the dem ands of utility.^i In Becker's view, these  
prem ises are shared between a general justification of property rights and the  specific  
justification of any particular system of property rights.
The general argum ent next relies on the  claim (e) th a t “people need individually to 
acquire, possess, use and consum e som e things in order to achieve (the m eans to) a 
reasonable degree of happiness.’’^̂  The corollary for the case of copyright would be that 
people who create  novel expressions, in order to  develop the expectation of adequate  
com pensation for undertaking creative activities, need an exclusive right to prevent others  
from  copying those expressions. The chief incongruity between th e  general justification for 
copyright and its specific application to copyright is the entity tow ard which the rights are  
directed. In the case of tangible property, property rights are directed with respect to the  
objects in possession: however, in the  case of intellectual property, the  rights are directed  
against the  actions of other individuals. Though both the  general and specific cases express 
th e  preservation of som e zone of exclusion, copyright’s zone of exclusion extends into the  
prerogatives of other actors, even when their actions do not diminish the acquisition.
Becker, Lawrence. Property Rights: Philosophic Four)d3tions. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Ltd., 1977), 57-58.
12 Ibid., 58.
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possession, use and consumption of the copyright holder in the sam e way th a t seizure of 
tangible property would.
The reason for this dissimilarity is the non-rivalrous status of intellectual property, its 
natural status as som ething tha t can be acquired and used by many people without being  
possessed or consum ed by any one of the  users. If the  general justification for property 
relies on the  prem ise th a t “people need individually to acquire, possess, use and consum e  
som e things in order to  achieve (the m eans to) a reasonable degree of h a p p in e s s " ,a n d  the  
types of things covered by th e  property right can be acquired and used without dim inishing  
the possession and consumption of others, the utilitarian justification of property rights does 
not require an exclusive right to copy in order to satisfy those who possess but did not create  
the expression.
This seem s appropriate since copyright is designed to  offer a m eans to increase the  
benefit for creators of novel expressions, although it must be kept in mind that this interest is 
instrum ental and subordinate to the u ltim ate end of satisfying the  public desire for an 
abundance of novel expression, i.e. overall utility. Still, for the  creator of a novel expression, 
it might easily be the  case tha t excluding others from  th e  use of th a t expression is som ething  
needed or persistently w anted as a prerequisite to undertaking the  activity. For instance, 
diary entries are expressions tha t m ay benefit a creator only as som ething from which others  
are excluded. This exam ple clearly points to the way in which exclusivity in a novel 
expression can be m aintained, which is to not release the  expression to  a public th a t may 
proliferate the idea.
Copyright enters  as an effective force only a fter publication, really m aking the  claim  
th a t a copyright holder ought to have th e  ability to exclude others from  acquisition and use 
that, once an expression was published, would otherw ise be possible w ithout the  copyright 
holder’s consent. The exclusivity enforced by copyright does not directly benefit the  creator
13 Ibid., 58.
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but enhances the possibility th a t sales of the expression could. Because of this, copyright’s 
exclusivity does not secure exclusivity in possession and use as an end but as a m eans to 
financial com pensation for cultural production. In doing so, copyright creates the expectation  
of com pensation for novel expression. While this does not justify th e  expectation of 
com pensation, it does further open the  question of what justifies a copyright in novel 
expressions.
The status of intellectual property as a nonrivalrous good m eans th a t exclusivity in its 
possession and use is not required in order to  prevent exhaustion of the  good; any person 
can use the  expression protected by copyright w ithout dim inishing any other person's use of 
it. Copyright carves out an exception to this situation in order th a t creators may restrict 
proliferation of an already published expression to those who pay for it and thereby creators  
can use cultural production to generate benefits. This argum ent holds well enough to 
continue applying Becker's logic, however, it should be noted th a t the presum ption of 
scarcity in cultural production is never established by the premise; the  only thing established  
is th a t copyright m ay serve as a m eans to satisfy cultural producers because it increases  
the ir likely returns from  the activity. The presum ption of scarcity is essential to staking out 
this position, but it is not self-evident.
Becker’s general argum ent for property rights asserts th a t (f) security in possession 
is impossible without restraint and (g) insecurity in possession is an insurm ountable barrier 
to  satisfaction; therefore, Becker concludes th a t (h) som e property rights in som e things are  
justified.!'^ With respect to the  specific case of copyright, th e  argum ent requires a final 
prem ise th a t denying creators the  control over novel expressions th a t creators need or 
persistently w ant is unjustifiable in so fa r as th a t control is perceived as a necessary m eans  
to satisfaction. This prem ise essentially asserts th a t copyright will serve as a corrective 
m echanism  for presum ably ineffic ient m arkets in cultural production because inefficient
w Ibid., 58.
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m arkets will negate th e  possibility th a t generating novel expression can be a m eans to  
satisfaction for creators. The argum ent asserts tha t the exclusivity offered by copyright will 
restore efficiency to  those m arkets, raising the  benefit from  generating novelty to the  creator 
who undertook the activity. This line of reasoning may hold, with the resulting conclusion 
that copyright is justified, but a caveat th a t sufficient countervailing concerns may negate or 
modify th e  rights established is still required.
The final prem ise opens the expectations of creators for exam ination because, by 
asserting th a t insecurity in possession is an insurm ountable barrier to satisfaction, it uses 
those expectations as an indication of th e  unjustifiability of denying them . To a large extent, 
however, the  expectations th a t serve as  the basis for a justification of copyright m ust be 
based upon the existing regime of copyright; it is hard not to think that, in the  absence of 
copyright or even in a regim e of shorter duration and narrower scope, the  expectations of 
creators would not be different. There is som ething problem atic about developing a 
justification after the fact based on expectations set up by the  fact.
But, it is clearly true tha t there is an expectation from  contem porary cultural 
producers that they will have exclusive control over the proliferation of the ir expressions even  
after those expressions have been published. This expectation of control, rooted in the  
current existence of copyright law, is the  basis for the often repeated claim  that, in the  
absence of the control, an insufficient am ount of novel expression will be generated. There  
is a profound circularity a t work in the logic justifying copyright because the expectation of 
com pensation is based on a  copyright established in th e  nam e of rem ediating  a scarcity 
which is presumed because of the logic of copyright and , to the extent th a t it exists, might be 
a product of copyright itself.
Elucidating and applying B ecker’s general argum ent to the  specific case of copyright 
has raised issues tha t require further investigation. Specifically, th e  presum ption of scarcity  
in novel expressions needs to be considered to determ ine how much of the presumption
16
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results from  a circular reliance on the expectations created a fter the  fact by the existence of 
copyright. Further, the  efficacy of copyright as a m ethod for alleviating scarcity, w hether the  
presum ption of scarcity is valid or not, cannot be taken  for granted.
II. The Presum ption of Scarcity
The claim th a t insufficient incentive for creativity exists w ithout copyright relies on an  
econom ic phenom enon called m arke t failure. M arket failure, according to economists, 
occurs when the private benefits and costs of an action differ from  the  social benefits and  
costs of the action. The result m ay be too much or too little of th e  action. In the case of 
copyright, m arket failure analysis generates the claim  tha t the social benefit of novel 
expression exceeds the  private benefit a creator can expect in the  absence of copyright. 
Because the  social benefit of novel expression exceeds the social cost while the private 
benefit may not exceed the private cost, a less than optim al am ount of novel expression will 
be produced. Copyright becom es a m echanism  for aligning the private net benefit of novel 
expression with th e  social net benefit of novel expression; it becom es a m ethod for enclosing  
externalities.
Externalities occur when social wealth is affected outside of direct productive 
processes, m eaning th a t overall w elfare is increased or dim inished but in a m anner such that 
the  im m ediate producer does not exclusively enjoy the benefit or suffer the  costs. In the  
case of cultural production, externalities arise because the novel expression of an idea  
creates benefits th a t are likely to  proliferate and redound to  m ore people than participated in 
th e  generation of th e  expression. Such externalities, in which the social benefit exceeds the  
private benefit, a re  called positive externalities. Copyright becom es a legal m echanism  for a 
creator to recapture som e econom ic value generated external to her production by insisting 
th a t those who wish to have access to a novel expression gain access from  the initial 
expresser (or her assignees) rather than the  im m ediate  proliferator of the  expression.
17
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Copyright not only exists because of the likelihood of externalities but operates by 
enclosing them ; therefore copyright relies on externalities for both its justification and value. 
But w hat is an externality? A positive externality is a m anifestation o f raw m aterial tha t is not 
consum ed in the productive process but increases in value as it proliferates and is held in 
com m on. Because of this, the  more som e expression is held in com m on, the  greater the  
value of the exception to its com m onality carved out by copyright. Thus the  value of a 
copyright is not increased by its scarcity, unless the specific em bodim ent of the good has 
som e value by virtue of its rarity (as in a first edition or painting), but rather the most valuable  
copyrights are those th a t govern som ething th a t all wish to access.
But the source of the  value of th e  positive externality in the  firs t instance is th a t the  
abundance of novel expressions that is supposed to result from  a regim e of copyright will be 
free to be taken up and used as raw m aterial by other creators. To the  extent tha t the scope  
and duration of copyright m akes this impossible by virtue of the control it exercises, the  value  
of the  externality copyright seeks to capture is dim inished. This understanding of the  nature  
of an externality acknow ledges the disutility of copyright fo r the society th a t grants it. And it 
expresses the tacit balance th a t has undergirded debate  surrounding copyright since its 
inception: granting control to  copyright holders m eans extracting freedom  from  those subject 
to copyright’s control. Still, acknowledging the  beneficial nature of positive externalities and  
the problem atic posed by the ir enclosure does not answ er the  question of whether 
expression will be scarce in the absence of enclosure.
The presum ptive scarcity o f novel expressions a t th e  base o f economic analysis of 
copyright is tha t cultural goods face a positive externality problem because novel expressions 
will be produced in insufficient quantities in the  absence of som e m echanism  to ensure  
com pensation for creators. Traditional econom ists th ink about the  net benefit of copyright in 
term s of an allocation of th e  benefits of novel expression betw een th e  producer and the  
consum ing public. Even the most favorab le  treatm ents  of copyright concede tha t it is
18
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possible for copyright to be too expansive, resulting in the elim ination of social benefit as all 
derivative uses of copyrighted m aterial are enclosed by copyright holders and the  possibility 
of effectively building on existing creative m aterial w ithout assigning any economic benefit to 
existing copyright holders disappears. Further, copyright has th e  potential for harm to 
copyright holders, who may benefit from unauthorized co pyin g .is
But economic theory has only so much to say about the  m agnitude of the  benefits 
and costs of copyright. Too much depends on the ends sought by copyright -  social welfare, 
com plete com pensation of producers, encouragem ent of further novelty -  and the specific 
scope and duration of the  rights assigned. The com plete absence of copyright suggests that 
producers will be undercom pensated while a perpetual and thoroughgoing copyright that 
leaves no derivative uses open will certainly deprive society of any benefit. Through it all, the  
presumption of scarcity on which th e  analysis relies rem ains an a  priori assum ption.
Historical evidence to contradict the presum ption of scarcity is abundant. For 
instance, statutory copyright only cam e into existence in the early 1 8 ^  century though it 
existed as a collusive business practice am ong publishers in England as early as the  16^  
century. Certainly, there  is historical evidence to suggest tha t novel expressions existed, in 
abundance a t tim es, before there  was ever a m ethod such as copyright to secure economic  
benefits for creators. Also certain is the  fac t th a t th e  growth of th e  internet in recent years 
indicates a strong willingness by individuals to invest large am ounts  of tim e in producing  
m aterials th a t are functionally bereft of protection from  uncom pensated appropriation once 
published to  the network. W hat then is the basis for the presum ption of scarcity tha t 
underlies the justification for copyright?
16 Watt. Richard. Copyright and Economic Theory: Friends or Foes? (Northhampton, MA; Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Inc., 2000}, 201.
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III. The Rom antic Author & The System of Creativity
Jam es Boyle charges tha t the presumption of an inefficient m arket for cultural goods 
results from  a rom antic notion of authorship underlying th e  current discussion of many 
issues related to property rights in information, including copyright. The rom antic author, he 
says, is “defined not by the  m astery of a prior set of rules, but instead by th e  transform ation  
of genre, th e  revision of form ."is The romantic author is th e  portal of imagination, a rare and  
ephem eral gateway for inspiration; the  basis in fac t for this notion of creativity is unclear to 
put it charitably, but it persists in the  discourse surrounding copyright with the result th a t the  
labor of the  author is privileged over the  other e lem ents of a system of creativity. By 
privileging the  labor of the  author over other elem ents of creativity, th e  rom antic view of 
authorship exaggerates the  private costs of creativity, raising the threshold a t which a creator 
will begin seeking to express novelty. By m aking creativity seem  unlikely to appear without 
copyright, the  a priori presum ption of an inefficient m arket for cultural goods in the absence  
of copyright prejudices the  analysis of the proper scope and duration of copyright needed to  
incentivize cultural production.
The rom antic view of authorship is neither the only nor th e  m ost rigorously 
constructed view on the subject. Psychologist M ihaly Csikszentm ihalyi’s 1 9 9 6  study 
Creativity  offers the following conception of creativity: “th e  interaction of a system composed  
of three elem ents: a culture th a t contains symbolic rules, a person who brings novelty into 
the  subjective dom ain, and a field of experts who recognize and validate the innovation.''!^ 
Setting up creativity as a system has two effects tha t distinguish it from  th e  rom antic notion. 
Creativity as a system relies on a culture with existing symbols and rules governing those  
symbols. The individual actor in the system of creativity presupposes the  creative output of
!6 Boyle, James. Shamans, Software, Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 54.
17 Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly. Creativity. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1996), 6.
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other people and creative activity takes place in the context of a lready existing symbols. The 
individual enters th e  system as a locus of com binatory activity rather than a gateway to some  
space o f im agination to which the creator has privileged access. Further, calling creative  
only output certified by a field of experts adm its tha t novelty is not sufficient for creativity. 
Being recognized as creative m eans tha t som e novelty has becom e part of the dom ain of 
symbolic rules that constitute the  raw m aterial of other creators. The creative individual is a 
necessary condition for novelty but is not a sufficient condition for th e  system of creativity.
W hile the system aticity of creativity is tacitly acknow ledged by the  logic tha t m akes  
novelty laudable, copyright primarily relies on the portrait of the author as a transform ative  
and radically novel figure; this em phasis on the author at the expense of the domain and  
field of creativity “plays down the  im portance of external sources by em phasizing the  unique 
genius of the author and the originality of the  w ork.’’^̂  view ing authors through the  lens of 
rom antic authorship em phasizes protecting the integrity of novel expressions because  
expressions generated under a myth of rom antic authorship obscure the crafting and  
com binatory functions actually undertaken by the author, perhaps to  the  detrim ent of those  
functions.
Relying on a  rom antic notion of creativity to justify the scarcity of novel expression  
results in a d isplacem ent of concerns for the  health of the public dom ain from which authors  
m ust draw raw m ateria l. Similarly, the  rom antic notion of the  author undervalues the social 
benefits of the uptake and modification of the  contributions of authors in favor of 
consideration of incentives for the “private” production of cultural goods by rom antic authors. 
In com bination, these  two factors lead to  a situation in which the  focus of copyright is on 
control for its own sake instead of em phasizing a careful balance betw een the  expectation of 
com pensation by cultural producers and the  public need for a robust dom ain of symbols 
available  to  future creators.
18 Boyle. Shamans, Software, Spleens, 114.
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But the  founding logic of copyright is utilitarian and based primarily on the  benefits  
expected to result from  its im plem entation. The romantic notion of th e  author, by ignoring 
the need for a robust public domain from which the  raw m ateria l of creativity can be drawn, 
provides support for the presumption of scarcity th a t drives copyright’s justification but 
invalidates the logic of public benefit that lies a t the core of the  Justification.
IV. The Efficacy of Copyright as a Solution to Scarcity
In addition to  altering the  perception of th e  creative process and thus the  legitimacy 
of copyright enclosures, copyright may be generating m aterial conditions th a t m ake novel 
expression scarcer in fac t and not Just in appearance. As copyright has increased in its 
scope and duration, particularly during the last one hundred years, it may have discouraged 
novel expression by encouraging concentration in the structures governing the  reproduction 
and distribution of cultural goods. This possibility brings into question the  validity of the  
second presupposition upon which the utilitarian Justification for copyright relies, tha t the  
existence of copyright actually generates a greater abundance of cultural production.
Prior to its restraint and subjugation to th e  public interest in the proliferation of ideas, 
copyright, a fter all, began as a collusive business practice am ong publishers and booksellers 
in England. Its genesis was a desire to accum ulate capital by lim iting reproduction and 
distribution of books to create  artificial scarcity in order to keep prices high. Does similar 
logic show itself in contem porary cultural production? One exam ple th a t suggests that 
cultural producers create scarcity through concentrating industrial organization is the film ed  
enterta in m ent industry, in which copyrighted cultural products serve as collateral for 
corporate finance and the basis for coercive productive structures.
One case of the capitalization of copyright by a major m edia corporation was the  
1 9 9 0  deal in which Rathe Com m unications Corporation bought a 76%  stake in M G M /U A fo r  
$ 1 .3  billion. In addition to $ 5 6 0  million in debt. Rathe financed the  deal by dividing and
22
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parceling out property rights established by copyrights in United Artists and M G M /U A  film s  
for a variety of m arkets and modes of d is tr ib u tio n ,s h o w in g  how thoroughly divorced from  
the  context of the  creative process the  rights derived from  copyright easily become. Further, 
the  distribution leverage developed using film ed enterta inm ent as capital is often brought to 
bear on the production of cultural goods them selves. In a recent exam ple, Disney 
Corporation anticipates using its ownership of the rights to the library of film s created during  
its recently dissolved partnership with Pixar Animation Studios to force Pixar back into a 
relationship with Disney .20 As a m atter of fact, in 1 9 9 8 , movies released by the top seven  
film  distributors accounted for 9 5  percent of dom estic box office earnings .21 W ithout access 
to distribution, which is dom inated by th e  old movie studios whose privileged position is 
based on capital accum ulated by exploiting copyright, reaching the public with a film  is 
extrem ely difficult. W ithout guaranteed distribution, m any film s will never even be m ade so, 
in effect, a very sm all slice of the business world effectively exercises a preem ptive veto over 
th e  production of film ed enterta inm ent. The power of the ir positions is a result of the scope  
and duration of copyright law because copyright serves as the basis for the  capital 
accum ulation that has created the ownership structure in the  film ed enterta inm ent industry. 
Sim ilar concentration of the m eans of distribution is evident in books and music, creating a 
privileged position not for the creators on behalf o f whom  copyright is invoked, but for the  
controllers o f the channels of distribution.
In one sense, the logic of increased com pensation leading to increased production  
seem s natural. This occurs because of th e  blind spot m anifested in traditional econom ic
19 Bettig, Ronald V. Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property. (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1996), 53.
20 McCarthy, Michael. “ Disney Dangles Film Library Over Mirimax, Pixar” USA Today. Aug 10, 2004. 
Apr 4, 2005. <http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/earnings/2004-08-10-disney_x.htm>
21 "The Motion Picture & Theater Industry Overview” Cushman & Wakefield Valuation Services. Dec 
2004. Apr 4, 2005 <http://valuation.cushwake.com/Documents/20493.pdf>
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analysis with respect to the relative power of actors in the m arketplace. Economic analysis  
too easily grants the  notion tha t com petition will characterize interactions in the  
m arketplace, failing to consider the evidence tha t capital accum ulation results in oligopolistic 
structures tha t skew  bargaining positions, as the evidence from  the film ed enterta inm ent 
industry illustrated. Copyright is a m ethod of accum ulating capital in the products of cultural 
production; this accum ulated capital becomes leverage th a t has been used by copyright 
holders to  secure assets in distribution th a t privilege their own content and freeze out 
independent producers of m edia content. In so fa r as copyright serves as the engine of 
accum ulation tha t has led to consolidation in the m edia industry and to the extent th a t such 
consolidation results in homogeneity rather than increasing novelty, the  current regim e of 
copyright in the United States serves not to facilitate  creation but to  stifle it.
The two presuppositions of the  utilitarian justification for copyright depend upon one 
another in ways th a t are not obvious a t first glance. As the  case of copyright in film ed  
enterta inm ent m ade clear, the  com m ercial structure th a t results from  profits based on 
copyright can actually m ake it m ore difficult for producers of novel expressions to reach the  
public because the  value of copyrighted m aterial has becom e capital for fueling m edia  
consolidation. Far from  being the solution (presupposition # 2 ) to an already existing  
situation of scarcity (presupposition # 1 ), copyright's historical existence, in fact, m ay  
perpetuate the scarcity th a t copyright claims to remedy.
But all creativity is not merely a result o f profit-m axim ization by corporations. There  
exists a long history of individuals driven by a creative impulse to seek  novel expression, 
often ignoring the  potential for personal enrichm ent. So the  consolidation of m edia and the  
difficulty tha t perhaps may arise in distributing novel expressions will not be a 
discouragem ent to  such personalities. But neither will the absence of a financial motive 
facilitated  by copyright. G ranted, copyright results in som e m easure o f creative control and
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not m erely a  financial interest and so the absence of copyright m ight result in less creativity 
from  those for whom control of their expressions is im portant.
Copyright, especially under the utilitarian justification, is about m oney more than  
anything e lse. The driving logic is that insufficient novelty will arise from  inadequate  
com pensation. Com pensation through copyright, a t least with th e  current expansive scope 
and duration available under the  law, has created conditions generally hostile to the  
hypostasized romantic author. The extent to  which such a notion of creativity is valid is 
doubtful but to the extent th a t it holds, com pensation through copyright need not be the  
driving influence.
V. The Utility of Copyright
This chapter problem atized two presuppositions of the  utilitarian Justification for 
copyright law: first, novel expressions will be overly scarce in the  absence of the power of 
creators to exclude others from  m aking copies of those expressions w ithout permission and, 
second, the  establishm ent of powers of exclusion for creators of novel expressions will result 
in an abundance of cultural production. The presum ption of scarcity relies heavily on a 
notion o f creativity, the  rom antic author, th a t is perpetuated by the structure of copyright law, 
but which downplays im portance of access to the  dom ain of raw m aterial fo r creativity. 
Further, the  establishm ent of copyright has resulted in the accum ulation of capital am ong  
m ajor enterta inm ent interests with the result th a t the field of creativity, by which novelty 
reaches the  public, has been captured by a sm all group of interests. Both of these  
conditions belie the logic o f copyright law as it was enacted; both, however, serve powerful 
interests in the  industry of cultural production.
W h at then are the  interests of th e  creative individual? Perhaps in Becker’s labor- 
desert justification for property there  is a justification for copyright tha t m atches the intuition  
th a t those who generate novelty ought to expect com pensation for it.
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The Labor-Desert Justification of Copyright
The Anglo-American logic of copyright relies explicitly on utilitarian logic of public 
benefit, but this is not the  only possible justification for copyright. Lawrence Becker 
establishes a justification for property th a t com bines labor with the concept of desert to  
m ake  a  claim for property rights generally. Becker’s labor-desert justification may serve as 
th e  basis for a specific justification of copyright, understood as property rights in the  
expression produced, by relying on the intention of individuals th a t generate  novelty and the  
requirem ents of satisfying those intentions.
I. From Labor to Desert
Becker begins developing a general argum ent for property rights in virtue of labor by 
relying on John Locke’s Second Treatise on Governm ent, from which Becker identifies two 
key contentions: “one is entitled to the whole of the value one’s labor adds to things 
and...one is entitled to  the other expected benefits as w e ll."22 Locke’s view has been 
criticized in a num ber of ways: Becker identifies the  key objection as th e  one opposed to the  
idea th a t any ownership of th e  labor in one’s body (which he also problem atizes) 
autom atically transfers to ownership in anything th a t one's labor is mixed with. “Why," he 
asks by paraphrasing Robert Nozick, “is it tha t investing one’s labor in som ething causes one 
to com e to own th a t thing? Why does it not instead just m ean tha t one has lost the  
investment?"23 If there  is no clear reason to  believe the mixing of labor with raw m ateria l 
results in the extension of personality rather than its contraction, the  transferability of labor 
alone does not justify property rights in the  thing produced.
Although Becker effectively refutes a property right based on th e  transferability of 
ownership in labor to  the  ownership of labor’s products, he allows th a t there  might be a claim
22 Becker, Property Rights, 35.
23 Ibid., 40 .
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for entitlem ent to  the products of one’s labor on the basis th a t som ething has been  
produced and no one besides the laborer deserves the product, and therefore it would be 
wrong for the laborer not to  have a property right In the product. Becker attributes this view  
to John S tuart Mill and identifies three conditions th a t support a claim  of entitlem ent: first, 
th e  labor must be beyond w hat is required by morality; second, the labor m ust produce 
som ething which would not have existed except for the labor; third, the  product m ust be 
som ething th a t no one suffers for being excluded from.:'* These conditions, when explicated, 
impose severe restrictions on entitlem ent to property rights based on labor alone.
Especially onerous is th e  no-loss requirem ent of the third condition. If com petitive  
parity is a good with respect to which no one ought to be placed a t a disadvantage, using Mill 
and Locke’s labor theory contradicts rather than confirms a justification of private property in 
the  m eans of production because not owning the m eans of production in a society where  
production is required to survive puts workers a t a serious d isadvantage to owners. Further, 
if property rights do not m erely include liberty rights for the  owners of property but also claim  
rights tha t require actions on the  part of others with respect to property covered by rights, 
then  property th a t does not extract a loss from those who m ust respect property rights could 
be difficult, if not Impossible, to discover.
Becker finally e lim inates th e  possibility th a t labor alone points to a sound Justification 
for property rights in the  th ing produced. He points out th a t the form  In which the labor 
theory is acceptable, particularly given the  no-loss provision, sim ply does not conform to  the  
circum stances in which property rights are granted. The fac t tha t property rights in the  thing  
produced are som etim es expected, while at other tim es not expected, points not to property 
rights based on the  transferability  of property in self to property in labor and then property in 
the  thing labored upon. Instead, the variability in the expectation th a t property rights will be 
granted as a result of labor expended highlights the idea th a t laborers deserve som e benefit
2“» Ibid., 41.
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for the ir labor -  w hether this is a property right in the  thing labored upon or som ething else.^s 
This notion of desert, derived from labor theory, may serve as a fundam enta l principle on the  
basis of which a general justification of property might be established.
Becker argues tha t desert is suitable as a fundam ental principle upon which to base 
an argum ent from  labor to property rights because desert itself is constitutive of morality. 
Every m oral system requires assigning praise or blam e, an activity th a t would be 
m eaningless without recourse to an idea th a t actions or character traits  can deserve  
approbation or reprobation, which m eans th a t desert is fit to  serve as a fundam ental 
principle.
Relying on Joel Feinberg's analysis of desert, Becker points out th a t a desert claim  
must have a basal reason, som e activity or character tra it in virtue of which a claim can be 
leveled. Becker asserts th a t “a person’s ‘adding value" to the world -  in the  sense of 
discovering, inventing or improving som ething which helps others -  can be a basis for a 
desert claim ." Once stipulations are added concerning th e  morality of th e  actions by which 
value is added, Becker "cannot im agine any objection to the  assertion th a t such ‘adding of 
value ‘ m ust be a basis for a desert-claim."26
Thus, Becker begins the  general labor-desert Justification for property with the prem ise tha t 
"[wjhen it is beyond w hat morality requires them  to do for others, people deserve som e  
benefit for the  value the ir (morally perm issible) labor produces, and conversely, they deserve  
som e penalty for the disvalue the ir labor p r o d u c e s . I n  the  specific case of copyright, the  
principle would be the  following: G enerating novel expressions is not morally required but 
does generate  value and , therefore, when the  generation of novelty is undertaken subject to
25 Ibid., 47 .
26 Ibid., 4 0 .
27 Ibid., 5 3 ^ .
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the  constraints of morality, creators deserve a benefit for the value they create; conversely, if 
creators generate disvalue, they deserve a penalty.
II. Creation of Value as the Basis for Desert
The specific justification of copyright under the  labor-desert principle rests primarily 
on the  supposition th a t generating novel expressions adds value to  the world. Is this the  
case? If it is not, then none of the discussion surrounding copyright would seem  to m ake  
m uch sense a t all. That the  generation of novel expressions is a positive, value-adding  
activity seem s as constitutive of copyright as desert is of morality because copyright is 
essentially a reward for generating novelty and, if generating novelty is not the  type of activity 
th a t ought to be rew arded, it seem s like the discussion never would have been opened.
There is, of course, an affirm ative argum ent to  be m ade for the  im portance of 
generating novelty: novel expressions expose com m only held ideas and symbolic 
understandings of th e  world in ways unanticipated by those who currently hold them . Insofar 
as hum ans possess the capacity to  generate symbolic understandings of the  world, 
recom bining those understandings in ways tha t m ay prom ote revisions of a subject’s 
understanding is about as near to declaring a purpose for hum an life as a hum anist is likely 
to com e. In their pow er to recontextualize hum an experiences, novel expressions create  
value by helping others, precisely in the  sense th a t Becker points to in his general principle.
Answering th e  question of w hether value is created affirm atively in the  case of novel 
expressions is even easier than in th e  case of som ething tangible and hvalrous because  
creating  a non-rivalrous good does not dem and removing any resources from  possible use by 
anyone else. Non-rivalrous goods are not consum ed in the creative process, which m eans no 
loss is imposed on others. Rather, new symbols are  produced, which others are free  to use 
in the absence of any form  of control over them .
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Of course, copyright seeks to  impose just such a regime of control, which could m ean  
th a t creation under a regime of copyright results in disvalue, which would dem and a penalty. 
But copyright can only generate disvalue when it is controlling som ething tha t would 
otherw ise be available, and copyright, by covering only novel expressions, would seem  to 
foreclose only creative possibilities not in existence prior to the  generation of novelty tha t 
gave rise to  the claim of desert in th e  first instance.
This m ay sound a bit abstract and tangled; let's slow down and develop this point. 
Before a novel expression is released to the public, there is no apparent loss from a creator 
keeping control over the  expression. For instance, Charles Darwin w aited until decades after 
his voyage on H M S  Beagle Xo publish On the Origin o f Species, but none of Darwin’s 
contem poraries could perceive him- or herself as worse off for not having access to its 
insights until a fter the book had been released. Som eone looking back from  the present 
might say "Oh, w hat a loss th a t such and such w asn’t  published during the author’s lifetim e” 
but this thinking only dem onstrates the retroactive rather than proscriptive m anner in which 
th e  value of novel expressions is judged. Clearly, one cannot know w hat one is missing if one 
never finds out th a t the thing exists in the  first instance; presence m ust precede absence if 
absence is to be perceived. So, even though disvalue can be created by excluding people 
from  uses of symbols th a t would otherwise be perm itted in the absence of the  control 
copyright offers, disvalue can only be created if value is first generated  by disclosure of novel 
expression.
Given tha t both value and disvalue can result from  the generation of novelty under a 
regim e of control such as copyright, what can be said about th e  sources and relative  
m agnitudes of th e  value and disvalue created? The likelihood of value being created  
increases as the  tim e  an expression has been circulating increases because the value of an 
expression increases as the expression proliferates and becom es more com m only  
understood. Disvalue is created when som ething tha t would otherwise be available to
3 0
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potential creators as raw m aterial for their own novelty generation is enclosed by a regim e of 
control instituted in response to a claim of desert. The potential disvalue of restricting the  
uptake and  modification of an expression increases as an expression proliferates because  
the  com m on understanding developed by tha t expression Is unavailable for use by those who 
possess it but do not own It.
Consider two contrasting cases. The characters and setting of th e  Harry Potter books 
were novel when they em erged. W hile they relied on many elem ents of literature th a t  
preceded them , such as magic and the  English boarding school system, the first book 
obviously portrayed som ething very appealing tha t was previously unavailable. At such a 
point, th e  value added to  the world by J.K. Rowling’s creation was clearly significant and the  
basis fo r a claim of desert. There are two ways in which her work’s inclusion under a schem e  
of copyright could be the  basis for disvalue. First, a sim ilar storyline -  if similar enough -  
could be the basis for a claim  of copyright infringem ent. Second, further expressions relying 
on the  symbolic vocabulary developed in the Harry Potter stories might be possible and novel 
in the ir own right but restricted because of the control over derivatives tha t is afforded under 
copyright law. The value of the  copyright on a Harry Potter novel am ounts to  an enclosure of 
the  value of not jus t words them selves but also the  value of the copyright extends to the  
e lem ents  of the story, setting, and characters under th e  doctrine of derivative works.
Novel expression within a regim e of copyright creates value by producing novel 
expressions based on existing m aterials. However, to th e  extent tha t copyright forecloses  
use of the  expression covered -  even as those expressions become part of the language and  
culture upon which people rely for crafting not Just com m ercial expressions but also private 
understandings of th e  world and their place within it -  creation with a system of copyright 
also creates disvalue. Copyright’s creation of value is a diachronic phenom enon in which the  
value created  by a novel expression increases, a t least initially, as the understanding  
em bodied in the expression proliferates and  is held com m only. Similarly, disvalue enters
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over t im e  as the  restrictions imposed on reem bodim ent of the  understanding conveyed in a 
novel expression come to  have force on the  uses to which som e novelty m ay be put. On 
balance, because the generation of novel expression can only create disvalue subsequent to 
creating  value, the disvalue tha t accrues cannot exceed the  value created. Further, because  
copyright is designed to control only expression and not ideas (even if it often blurs this  
distinction in practice), there  is certain to  be som e value created by novel expression not 
cancelled by the  enclosure of expression copyright provides.
W hile these sources of disvalue are certain not to  exceed the  value created, and  
alm ost certainly will be less than the value created, they do count against the  net value tha t 
can be ascribed to an act of novelty generation when applying Becker's desert principle. 
Therefore, even considering the  potential disvalue resulting from  copyright controls, novel 
expression under a regime of copyright generates value th a t may be the  basis for a desert 
claim though tha t value is less than the whole am ount of value created by the novel 
expression.
Ultim ately, generating novel expression is a deserving activity on th e  basis of value  
created even under conditions th a t create  disvalue by restricting the  up take  and modification  
of the  expression. Establishing the creation of value provides sufficient im petus to  move  
analysis beyond the  fundam ental principle of desert and into the conditions on benefits  
aw arded imposed by Becker's labor-desert theory. That said, the  relationship between the  
value created by novelty and th e  dlsvalue created by its control will rem ain im portant in 
refining the sort of control th a t copyright ought to  offer, particularly with respect to the  scope 
and duration of copyright.
111. Fitness of Copyright as a Deserved Benefit
The next step in Becker's justification of property from  labor-desert moves from  
establishing the  claim of desert to ensuring fitness of th e  benefit deserved: "The benefits
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and penalties deserved are those...fitting for the  type of labor done" (5 4 ). Becker relates the  
fitness of a benefit for the type of labor expended to  the  motives of the  individual 
undertaking value-creating labor. Becker determ ines fitness based on the motives of the  
laborer in order to avoid collapsing into a utilitarian argum ent because, if the  criterion for 
fitness is the general cost and benefit of the  outcom e produced, the  fitness test is essentially  
consequentalist. Fitness under a situation of desert ought to rely on satisfying the deserving  
actor rather than on a generalized calculus. The fitness condition on deserved benefits  
under the  general labor-desert justification applies to the specific case of copyright as well.
The fitness tes t of the labor-desert justification requires th a t the  benefit offered by 
copyright for generating novel expression satisfies the motives for undertaking the  
generation of novel expressions. M ore precisely, the  question of fitness speaks to the  issue 
of w hether property rights in the  things produced, basically what copyright provides, are a 
fitting benefit for generating novel expressions.
Determ ining the  fitness o f the benefits offered by copyright based on the motives of 
people who undertake creative activity opens the com plicated question of the  motives for 
generating novel expression. Som e creators’ m otives are financial, others' motives are  
ideological, and o thers ’ motives are  deeply personal in th a t they reference no one aside from  
th e  creator herself. To com plicate the question, these  motives do not exist in isolation from  
one another nor from  the general conditions of creativity in a specific historical setting. 
Further, the fitting rewards for each will vary. If financial com pensation is th e  m otive, money  
will be benefit enough to satisfy th e  motive of th e  creator. On th e  other hand, ideological 
novelty seeks a change in the  principles by which the  viewer lives. No system of laws can 
accom plish this change, but perhaps som ething could be done to  facilitate  the opportunity of 
an expression to work upon its intended audience. Finally, novelty th a t results from  an 
individual’s desire to  understand him self seeks a result th a t no law  can guarantee and  
perhaps seeks an end th a t no copyright law could even facilitate . S tarting from  the  motives
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num erous. Fortunately, evaluating the  specific case of copyright perm its using the  benefit 
offered as a starting point, which m eans the  fitness of copyright as a benefit for generating  
novel expressions can be m easured against the motives of creators.
There are two benefits that copyright offers to  satisfy a claim o f desert based on 
value created with labor expended: control over the  proliferation of an expression and  
com pensation for ceding control. Unlike th e  utilitarian justification, in which com pensation is 
primary because the  purpose of copyright is promoting public disclosure and dissemination, 
the labor-desert Justification em phasizes control over an expression and therefore focuses  
on satisfying the m otives of the creator. Control aim s to  facilitate  th e  creator’s motive, 
w hatever it may be, by placing disposition of a novel expression under the  prerogative of the  
person who created it. Com pensation can be facilitated by sale of reproduction rights or 
copies them selves; proliferation can be facilitated by m aking reproduction and dispersal of 
the expression easy. W hatever motive a creator seeks, it can be better facilitated by control 
over an expression than by the absence of control.
IV. Proportionality of the  Benefit from  Copyright to the  Value Created
Control m ay be a fitting  benefit for creativity, however, copyright m ust be subject to a 
proportionality tes t according to Becker’s labor-desert Justification, specifically th a t "the 
benefits and penalties deserved are those proportional to the values and disvalues 
produced.”28 It is im portant to  note th a t proportionality ought to be m easured relative to the  
values created rather than  the  labor expended. Becker explains this by referencing the  
desert principle, which relies on labor as a necessary but not sufficient condition for desert, 
i.e. a change in value w ithout labor is not deserving and labor tha t does not a ffect value is 
not deserving.
28 Ibid., 54.
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The proportionality requirem ent raises another tough question with respect to 
providing property rights as a benefit for the generation of novel expression: W hat am ount of 
benefit is proportional to  the value created by a novel expression? Answering this question 
requires understanding the value of a novel expression writ large and, further, understanding  
how much of th a t value ought to be attributed to the  prior symbols required for an  
expression's form ation com pared to how much may be attributed to the novelty produced 
using those symbols.
Csikszentm ihalyi’s system of creativity offers a fram ew ork in which these questions 
can begin to be m ade sense of. One of the elem ents of Csikzentm ihalyi’s system is the field  
of creativity, which is composed of experts who validate innovation as creative .29 With 
respect to  som e fields, such as science, the experts tha t com pose the  field are often a small 
group of elites, but, with respect to cultural innovations like books, music and films, the field 
of creativity is considerably m ore inclusive. W hile there are som e individuals with 
considerably m ore power over w hat is construed as creative, such as owners of distribution 
networks and critics whose opinions are widely circulated, the  basic standard for the success 
of cultural products is com m ercial: how many people pay for access to a novel expression is 
the  primary m easure of the  expression’s worth. Also im portant as a  source of value, though 
used less because it is a less com m ensurable m easure, is the  influence som e expression  
has on future expressions; the  am ount subsequent expression owes to the symbolic 
language developed in som e prior expression is a significant, but tough to quantify, source of 
value.
Any expression relies on prior expressions for the raw m aterial of w hatever novelty it 
produces. Therefore, the value added by the  labor of generating novel expressions must be 
w hatever rem ainder is produced once the value em bodied in the  prior expressions is 
factored out. This operation seem s, frankly, jus t about impossible. Even given fairly precise
29 Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity, 6.
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distinctions about w hat is novel and w hat is prior, ascribing value to  these  respective pieces 
would be very com plicated. For instance, perhaps the value of the prior expressions 
them selves is enhanced by their being recast in novel form s. For instance, the short stories 
of Philip K. Dick have recently enjoyed a resurgence in popularity because they were m ade  
into m ovies. Such recycling of the e lem ents of expressions is very com m on, particularly in 
the  culture industries th a t reprocess content through one m edium  a fte r another. Even when  
the bearers of copyright and the im pact of influences are  fairly easy to identify, negotiations  
over com pensation can be incredibly tedious and com plicated. Trying to  im plem ent a system  
th a t would require regular agreem ent on such value in order to determ ine the  proportionality 
of benefit to  value added would be more likely to frustrate  the motives of creators than  
satisfy them .
A novel expression may create value by com bining existing symbols in such a way 
tha t people com e to  understand their life and world in a previously unavailable way, and the  
field of creativity is the place in which signals about these judgm ents are generated. This 
recontextualization of experience by novel expressions seem s most likely not long after an 
expression has been released because understandings opened by new  expressions tend to 
be taken  up and subtly incorporated into the culture th a t shaped the  expression. The 
dom ain of creativity, another feature  of Cziskzentm ihayli’s system, highlights a d ifferent way 
in which novel expressions can be sources of value. Novel expressions also create value by 
becom ing th e  raw m aterial for subsequent expressions, adding symbols to the dom ain of 
creativity from  which generators of novelty draw their symbols. Derivative uses, these uses 
in which an expression becom es raw m aterial for ano ther expression, seem  more likely a fter 
som e period of tim e has gone by to allow th a t m aterial to  be taken up into a context th a t can 
be recom bined for fu ture  texts.
The first sense, the sense in which novel expressions add value as expressions qua  
expressions, seem s to  most clearly m erit a benefit because the person receiving the  benefit
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is th e  proxim ate cause of the generation of the expression adding value. In contrast, 
som eone drawing upon an existing expression uses (without consuming) the value of existing 
raw m ateria l to generate  further novelty, which has value both as recontextualizer and text, 
as both novelty and raw m aterial for future novelty. The difficulty posed by aw arding control 
over expressions as the benefit for adding value is th a t awarding control over novel 
expressions greatly dim inishes the ability of others to modify and recom bine existing material 
in th e  service of generating future novelty. This would hardly seem  to be a problem if all 
creativity did not already require existing raw m ateria l, held in com m on.
But since creativity relies on a  com mon dom ain of symbols th a t serve as raw  
m ateria l, removing raw m aterial from  the  com mon to satisfy th e  desert claim  of one person 
could e lim inate the  possibility for future creators to  draw upon the  com mon for raw m aterial. 
It seem s to privilege the present over the  past and future; it ought to be suspect as an  
a ttem p t to  establish a privileged position on previously level terra in . Because copyright can 
be so dam aging to the  interests of those who are potential generators of novelty, the  benefit 
offered by copyright could easily exceed its proportionality to the  value created.
V. Appropriateness of Copyright as a Benefit for Value Created
Becker introduces a hierarchy of appropriateness to highlight instances in which 
control tak ing  the form  of a property right in the thing produced is not always the most 
appropriate m anner in which to aw ard a benefit. B ecker’s hierarchy of appropriateness for 
benefits in response to desert takes  th e  following shape: If nothing but property rights in the  
things produced will do (subject to fitness and proportionality tests), property rights are  
deserved; if a substitute for th e  thing produced can be considered fitting and proportional, 
the substitute or the  original is deserved; if property rights are not either fitting or 
proportional or if the  benefits of the rights exceed th e  value produced by the  labor, property
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rights a re  not deserved.3° The implication of the hierarchy fo r copyright is th a t copyright, 
tak ing  th e  shape of exclusive control over an expression even a fter the  expression has begun 
to proliferate, is only a fitting benefit for generating novelty if nothing else will do. Rem em ber 
th a t th e  criterion for w hether exclusive control over a novel expression will do is the intention  
of the  creator for creating in the first instance. For som e motives, control over the thing  
produced seem s to be all th a t will do; in other cases, a substitute may be acceptable. For 
instance, if th e  m otive for generating novelty is financial, substitutes for control are certainly  
available.
Compulsory licenses are an exam ple of a structure within copyright law tha t awards  
financial com pensation w ithout guaranteeing exclusivity. Compulsory licenses allow anyone  
"upon paying a statutorily fixed fee , [to] use an  author’s work without even contacting h im .”3i 
Compulsory licenses effectively uncouple financial com pensation from  exclusive control by 
allowing all uses and apportioning com pensation based on use. Such a schem e would seem  
to be preferable in many ways to exclusivity over expressions because it would im m ediately  
open up the  possibility of transform ation while ensuring th a t som e com pensation would flow  
to creators.
But it is not th e  case tha t a substitute for control over the actual expression will 
always adequately satisfy a creator's m otives for undertaking novel expression. For instance, 
som eone who creates an expression as a critique could quickly find a revision in circulation  
tha t reverses its ideological stance. In such a  situation, th e  creator would have no recourse  
if control over an expression, once released, was im possible to exercise. Therefore, a 
compulsory licensing system could fail in im portant ways to  satisfy the m otives of creators by 
denying the  control over an expression th a t m ight be required to prevent dilution of an 
ideological motive for generating expression.
30 Becker, Property Rights, 54.
31 Goldstein, Copyright's Highway, 15.
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It seem s like copyright, understood as the control it grants the bearer over the thing  
produced, might be the only benefit th a t could com pensate for novel expression if th e  motive  
concerning the creator is the integrity of the  work th a t is copyright's subject. In one sense, 
this is th e  most com pelling argum ent for the  grant of a property right in the thing produced  
because it would be very easy to im agine circum stances in which the use of a novel 
expression could contravene the  wishes o f the expression’s generator, even in ways th a t so 
fully violate the purpose of the  creative act th a t the  creator might wish he or she had never 
undertaken the project. This m easure of control, though it seem s im portant under the  labor- 
desert justification, is currently the  least vibrant part of current United S tates copyright law, 
which has a specific provision for what is called Fair Use.
Fair Use carves out an exception from  uses of copyrighted works th a t would 
otherwise be infringing based on a balance am ong the  following four factors: the purpose of 
the  use (favoring noncom m ercial), the nature of the  work (m ore latitude for scholarship than  
fiction), the am ount taken  from  the original work (less is better), and th e  effect of the  use on 
sales of the  copyrighted work (less is better).^^ Particularly when the use is not com m ercial 
nor anticipated to  affect the sales of the  copyrighted work, as in the  case of altering the  
ideological perspective in an expression, the  avenues for a copyright holder to exercise 
control by asserting a property right in the  work produced are lim ited.
Fair Use exists because of the  tac it acknow ledgem ent th a t creation is an activity tha t 
requires raw m aterial. This adm ission corresponds to a principle m ade explicit by Locke 
when he said there  can be no objection to  property rights based on labor "at least w here  
there  is enough, and as good, left in com m on for others."^^ Becker a ttem pts  to m ake good 
this e lem en t of Locke’s theory by enjoining against aw ards of property rights in cases when 
the  benefit would exceed the value produced by labor. If the  value added by generating
32 Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights an d  Copywrongs, 2 6 .
33 Becker, Property Rights, 35.
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novelty does not include the  value of the  raw m aterial incorporated in a novel expression, but 
th e  property right granted in the  novel expression prevents the uptake and modification of its 
constituent parts, the  property right is too expansive to accord with Becker's labor-desert 
theory and m ay relegate copyright to the  third tier of Becker’s hierarchy of appropriateness -  
th e  level a t which property rights in the thing produced are inappropriate.
United S tates  copyright, which currently has a duration of th e  lifetim e of the  author 
plus 7 0  years and captures greater than 9 9 .8 %  of the value offered by a perpetual 
copyright,34 seem s to  be in serious jeopardy with respect to the  third tier of Becker’s 
hierarchy. If the enclosure of virtually all the  value of a creative expression does not exceed 
the  value added by creative labor then very little value indeed is being ascribed to  the  raw 
m aterial of an expression. Further, the expansiveness of the dom ain enclosed as derivative  
works, including "translation, musical arrangem ent, dram atization, fictionalization, motion 
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgm ent, condensation, or any other 
form  in which a  work m ay be recast, transform ed, or ad ap ted , a l s o  adds to the  benefit 
afforded by property rights as produced by the current regime of copyright. Because of the  
broad scope and alm ost indefinite duration of copyright in the United States, it is not 
proportional to th e  value created and therefore falls into the third tier of Becker’s hierarchy 
w here it is an  inappropriate benefit in response to desert.
VI. Harm onizing Copyright with the  Labor-Desert Justification
Although copyright as it is currently constituted in the United States is overbroad, it 
does not follow th a t there  is no regim e of copyright th a t incapable of satisfying the  desert 
claim s of creators as well as th e  conditions im posed by appropriateness, fit, proportionality
34 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 261 (2003)
35 17 use  101.
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and preservation of the com mons. How might copyright be redrawn to com ply with the  labor- 
desert justification?
With regard to financial com pensation, there is no clear indication th a t the current 
system  even adequately com pensates for value created. The most novel expressions, 
requiring great labor and creative energy from  the creator, m ay not generate  much if any 
value under the  regim e of copyright. Conversely, the most tired and form ulaic sequel could 
easily be a financial boon but require very little adding of value by expenditure of labor. In 
fact, the  returns from  a sequel may be based on little more than recycling of the value of 
symbols generated by earlier novelty but enclosed by copyright such th a t the  reuse of the  
symbols is not subjected to the  full range of creative possibilities existing in the m arketplace. 
But is there a better way to determ ine how much value has been created than the m arket 
m echanism s currently in use? Certainly, no one wants to see rewards doled out by cultural 
czars pretending to  serve th e  universal interest, but a system th a t more clearly  
acknow ledges the role of raw m aterial in constituting novel creation m ight actually enhance  
th e  am ount of attention paid to truly innovative work by facilitating, rather than obstructing, 
the generation of derivatives. The current artificial scarcity in derivative works caused by 
copyright effectively lowers the threshold for the recognition of innovation. A system th a t  
more effectively facilitated  creativity would enhance the  possibilities for financial and other 
kinds of recognition for those to whom a significant creative debt is owed.
With regard to control for the sake of ensuring the  integrity of th e  m eaning in a novel 
expression, Becker's theory seem s to dem and a property right in the  th ing  produced as the  
only benefit that fittingly satisfies the m otives of the creator. But such control for its own 
sake seem s to provide a benefit in excess of the value added by the  work of a creator 
because it forecloses th e  opportunities for others to modify not ju s t symbols introduced by 
the  innovation but, to a certain extent, those th a t also constitute the raw m aterial for a novel 
expression. Further, som ething strange but im portant happens with th e  possession of non-
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rivalrous goods. Unlike a piece of tangible property, which seem s m ore closely wedded to 
th e  personality of its owner the longer it exists, non-rivalrous goods proliferate and becom e  
m ore widely held as the ir value increases. In a very real sense, the  value of an expression as  
a way to view the  world becom es m ore diffuse as it increases in value; the  uses to which that 
value can be put ought not be restricted by the individual who generated  it when it has 
becom e an e lem ent of th e  self-understanding of others. Tropes upon the  m eaning of an 
expression are  one of the primary ways of recontextualizing experience in order to m ake  
sense of oneself; forbidding this by granting extensive control over a novel expression to its 
generator simply ignores the position of those who generated prior m ateria l in favor of 
rewarding those who are currently creating to the  detrim ent of fu ture  creators. The capture  
of value by control of novel expressions exceeds the value added by th e  generation of 
novelty.
Finally, self-valorization through the generation of novelty does not seem  to dem and  
a property right in com pensation. Labor undertaken for its own sake has a self-referential 
m otive th a t does not dem and a reward based on a claim  of desert. It m ay be appropriate to 
offer honor and recognition for particularly notable form s of self-expression. A more fitting  
reward, though, would be the preservation of a robust public dom ain from  which self- 
valorizing creators of both the present and future can draw inspiration and raw m aterial.
The labor-desert justification of property rights facilitates a claim  of desert from  
individuals who generate  novelty based on the value added to the  lives o f others by their 
labor. The Justification, however, lays a num ber of restrictions upon the  benefits th a t restrict 
the  expansiveness of property rights aw arded. Further, property rights ought only to  be 
aw arded when those rights are the  only reward th a t can satisfy the intention behind the  labor 
of th e  individual who claim s desert; not all instances of novelty generation require property 
rights as a reward and even those th a t do might run afoul of som e form s of intentions a t the  
expense of others. The labor-desert justification outlined by Becker validates the intuition
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th a t creators deserve a benefit for generating novel expressions but seriously problem atizes  
m aking copyright, understood as the provision of an exclusive right to copy an expression, 
into the form  the benefit takes.
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The Political Liberty Justification of Copyright 
Any system of copyright is bound to be just one e lem ent of a more com prehensive  
political system. Such a system will have not just laws relating to property but also a full 
system o f political liberties, entitlem ents and policy goals. Copyright needs to be considered  
within th e  broader political system of which it is a part to  ensure th a t its effects accord with 
the balance of the political system. On this count, the  specific character of a political system  
often provides a justification for property as well as imposing limits on the  exercise of 
property rights; these will be im portant in understanding how copyright fits  into a system of 
political liberty.
I. Justification from  Political Liberty to  Property
Becker’s final line of justification for property rights relies on th e  compatibility of 
property with an existing system of political liberty. Becker asserts th a t “the regulation of 
acquisitive activities, by what am ounts to a system of property rights, is...required to preserve  
liberties to  which people are entitled .” The system of regulation th a t takes  shape as property 
rights is required because "it is a fac t th a t hum an beings will try to  acquire things, control 
them , exclude others from  their use, modify them , and use them  as w ea lth .” Further, and  
crucially, “the effective prohibition of such activities...would require a com prehensive and 
continuous abridgem ent of people's liberty which...is a t best unjustifiable and a t worst flatly  
prohibited by the existence of political liberties to  which people are entitled, m orally.” ®̂ 
Essentially, Becker argues th a t there  is a presumption built into a system of political liberty 
against interfering with the m aterial liberties of individuals and th a t m aterial liberty includes 
undertaking acquisitive activities, which could only be prohibited by abridging political liberty 
generally.
36 Becker, Property Rights, 75.
4 4
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The first noteworthy fea tu re  of the political liberty justification is tha t it presum es a 
rigorously defined system of political liberties and Justifies property by claiming tha t 
property’s abolition would be hostile to political liberty. This m akes property a derivative  
rather than a fundam ental right; its solidity requires a foundation in political liberty. Becker 
offers som e essential features of any system of political liberty strong enough to provide a 
general Justification for property. First, political liberties m ust be rights, which m eans that 
others do not have an unconditional claim on restricting w hatever activities political liberty 
protects. Second, political liberty must be concerned with protecting from  interference  
activities tha t are m aterially  and not merely form ally possible; otherwise, political liberties 
have no force. Finally, rights afforded under a system of political liberty must be basically 
com patible with a universal right o f each individual to survive; individual property rights 
cannot extend to  obstructing th e  continued existence of others. Becker notes th a t any 
system o f political liberty this robust, in addition to supporting a Justification for property 
rights, also im poses lim itations on those property rights .
This raises an interesting question: “W hat conditions are  sufficient to d efeat to the  
non-interference presum ption (and thus invalidate the corresponding claim  rights)?"^^ For 
an answ er to this question, recourse to the character o f the presum ed system of political 
liberties is necessary. This question becom es especially im portant in considering copyright 
because property rights in expressions differ so significantly from  property rights in tangible  
goods.
II. Copyright's Inversion of the  Political Liberty Justification
The general Justification from  political liberty highlights a crucial fea tu re  of copyright 
as a specific regim e of property. Copyright is currently instituted within the fram ew ork of a 
system  o f political liberty th a t provides backing for property rights generally. But, unlike
3r Ibid., 80.
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m any property rights relating to tangible property, im m aterial goods are property only to  the  
extent th a t others are precluded from infringing uses of them . In the  case o f copyright, this 
preclusion from the otherwise existing m aterial liberty to copy must m eet the  conditions 
necessary to  d efeat the  non-interference presumption.
The inversion of th e  justification from  political liberty with respect to  copyright results 
from  the  non-rivalrous nature of the  expressions copyright is designed to  provide control 
over. Prohibiting -  not allowing -  the acquisition, use and m odification o f non-rivalrous 
goods requires the  regulation of m aterial liberty. In B ecker’s general justification, property 
form alizes and facilitates individual action th a t is taken  to be inherent to hum an behavior; in 
its specific application, copyright is a sanction on behavior tha t would otherwise be widely 
allow able. Copyright is not covered under the preference for m aterial liberty that generally  
sanctions property under the political liberty justification; copyright is th e  exception to the  
preference for m aterial liberty.
As an exception to the general presum ption of non-interference with m aterial liberty, 
no copyright has any force without at least the th rea t of interference. Therefore, copyright 
requires a justification apart from  the  system of political liberty because interference claims 
cannot be derived from  political liberty. Support for copyright can only be provided by the  
existence of a claim right, a right with corresponding duties on the  part of another to  
undertake or forebear from  som e action,38 th a t trum ps the  non-interference claim. Here, the  
elem ents of the system of political liberty against the  backdrop of which the justification from  
political liberty is form ulated  enter for it is within tha t system  tha t claim  rights are  
established.
Do copyright holders have a claim  right th a t dem ands interference, over the  
presum ption of non-interference, with th e  liberty of others to  use and modify the expressions 
covered by copyright? In a s ta te  with a copyright established by statu te, such a claim exists.
38 Ibid.. 11.
46
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
But, because property rights are derivative from the  political system , the  enforcem ent of 
copyright cannot abrogate political liberties even though it a im s to  restrict m aterial liberty.
Obviously, the  establishm ent of any claim right is going to a ffec t the  m aterial liberty 
of those who are not right-holders but who have a duty with respect to the right-holder. All 
rights, though, a re  not equiprimordial; som e are fundam enta l and others are derivative. 
Sim ply because a copyright holder can claim a right to enforcem ent of copyright does not 
m ean th a t those subject to copyright enforcem ent do not them selves have rights to free  
expression or privacy tha t may frustrate  copyright enforcem ent. And, if those fundam ental 
rights conflict with the  enforcem ent of derivative rights, som e priority will have to  be 
established.
III. Copyright W ithin a System of Political Liberty
Becker’s Justification from  political liberty highlights the dependence of property 
rights upon the broader system of political liberty in order to set the  conditions under which 
action by the s ta te  on behalf of property is warranted. A copyright tha t establishes exclusive 
control for a creator but is not enforced to police th a t exclusivity is hollow. But the  
enforcem ent of a system  of copyright m ust not be hostile to the  broader system of political 
liberty from  which property rights a re  derived. This injunction against abridging political 
liberty is especially potent in the case of copyright because copyright is property only to  the  
extent th a t it is enforced while m ost property lends itself much m ore agreeably to  exclusivity.
As th e  ease of copying, using and modifying expression becom es greater, th e  effort 
to  establish exclusive control over novel expressions on behalf of copyright holders becom es  
m ore likely to offend political liberties related to  privacy. And, th e  more broadly construed  
are  prohibitions on derivative uses o f expressions, the m ore likely those prohibitions a re  to  
transgress political liberties related to  self-expression. There is a significant danger th a t the  
steps required to enforce broad and enduring copyrights, particularly given the ease of
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reproduction and distribution with digital technology, will require breaching political liberties 
like freedom  of expression and freedom  from  unreasonable searches tha t are constitutive of 
property rights generally, including copyright specifically.
The problem posed to copyright by the  justification from  political liberty is not 
w hether com pensation for generating novel expressions is warranted: political processes 
establish the  existence of claim s on behalf of copyright holders. These processes are 
derived from  an existing political system, which must have its own free-standing justification. 
Rather, the justification from  political liberty requires tha t claim s on the  basis of copyright be 
understood as derivative from  constitutive political liberties and tha t the  enforcem ent of 
copyright does not require “com prehensive and continuous abridgem ent of people's  
liberty."39
For this reason, satisfying the purpose of copyright law in raising the  expected private 
benefit to  individuals who generate  novel expression should be done in a  way that 
interference with the  use and m odification of expressions is as lim ited as possible. The idea 
th a t those who create value through labor expended generating  novelty deserve som e  
benefit for creating  th a t value is not, in itself, hostile to political liberty. But a benefit tha t 
requires securing enduring control for copyright holders when individuals would otherwise be 
a t liberty to use novel expressions without dim inishing th e  value of th a t expression cannot be 
com patible with a robust system  of political liberty. Com pensation m ust be uncoupled from  
control, and statutory copyright returned to its origin in public benefit.
39 Ibid., 75.
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Conclusion
Copyright exists because it seem ed like a good idea to publishers. Its origins as a 
collusive business practice am ong British stationers are  well established and easy to  
understand; a fter all, monopoly profits are every producer’s dream . Even though they were 
aw are o f copyright's ignoble beginning, the  British Parliam ent fe lt it was prudent to grant 
som e lim ited form  of monopoly in novel expressions so they established a statutory copyright 
in 1 7 0 9 .  The United S tates followed suit once they began setting out the ir own laws about 
such things. Som ewhere during the  early legislative history of copyright, the idea tha t 
copyright prom otes a public good started circulating; th e  idea seem s sensible enough.
This logic, by which copyright is presented as a bargain betw een the public and  
innovators, is seldom  presented as th e  justification for copyright any longer. Instead, 
copyright persists because it accords with a persistent intuition many people share tha t 
creators ought to be com pensated for creating, an intuition largely generated by the  
existence of copyright as the m eans of com pensation. The rhetoric of authorial rights and  
creative control m akes up the  substance of the argum ents forwarded for copyright as it 
currently exists.
There is also a sensible reason for this shift in rhetorical strategy: the broad and  
enduring copyright currently established under United S tates copyright law m akes no 
pretense of offering anything to the public in exchange for the monopoly granted by the law. 
Instead, copyright m akes a claim  on all the  value created by a novel expression. The  
argum ents for expansive copyright protection rely on inflated rhetoric about the scarcity of 
novelty to justify copyright’s expansiveness, but this is a  scarcity th a t copyright itself has  
created by facilitating the concentration of distribution and lim iting the  opportunity to revise 
existing expressions. Copyright claim s to  work on behalf of the  creator even though th e  most 
powerful figures of cultural production are not artists, authors and film m akers  but industry 
executives tha t control access to  distribution. If United S tates copyright law was primarily
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concerned with th e  interests of creators, why would it provide the  w eakest protection for the  
in terest of creators in the integrity of their work but go to great lengths to ensure revenue  
from  com m ercial uses flow to copyright holders? The institutional political morality of 
copyright does not square with its sound and valid normative justifications.
And yet copyright is more im portant now than perhaps it ever has been because  
copying is easier than  ever before; digital m edia can be reproduced and modified using 
softw are and hardw are com m only owned by the  residents of a ffluent countries, technology 
th a t becom es more widely available each day. This dem ocratization of copying has been 
followed swiftly by a dem ocratization of distribution as well; the  internet radically 
decentralizes the m ovem ent of data  by m aking publishing as easy as writing. This 
decentralization of copying and distribution results in the  migration of copyright's effects  
further from  their roots in the guild system with the  result tha t th e  agents constrained by 
copyright's provision o f exclusivity no longer perceive their interest in abiding by its strictures. 
And so the  logic of copyright faces  a contradiction: the people in whose nam e copyright has 
been granted no longer see fit to respect its injunctions.
Copyright holders have responded by labeling file-sharing theft, assum ing that 
property through copyright exists to codify a natural right rather than understanding it as 
derivative of a political system Justified by the  consent of the governed. And, to protect their 
interests, copyright holders call fo r an enforcem ent regime th a t would be hostile to the  
liberties constitutive o f the United S ta tes ’s political system. Efforts to restrict the  flow of 
inform ation over the  internet, the  technological innovation tha t has m ade copyright as 
contentious an issue as  it has been in the last 3 0 0  years, can only succeed by changing the  
architecture of th e  in ternet itself. The internet seem s endlessly adaptab le  because it is Just 
hardw are, not discrim inating am ong the  data passing through it, tha t executes a protocol. 
This protocol is Just a few  sim ple rules th a t allow any device to  connect any other device. 
Unless intelligence is placed in the  technology of the  internet itself through the revision of
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protocols and the reprogram m ing of network hardware, the  internet will continue to be 
incapable of restricting the  distribution of anything potentially digitized. Such intelligence 
would hardly be useful only to  prevent the  infringem ent of copyright; in fact, it couid be used 
to prevent any sort of com m unication over the internet.
Efforts to intim idate equipm ent and software m anufacturers into complying with 
digital rights m anagem ent protocols being promulgated by com panies in the  music and  
movie industries th a t control content are already underway. Just this te rm , the Suprem e  
Court heard the case of M G M  v. Grokster; the  decision in th a t case could open the way for 
copyright holders to sue engineers who design software or hardware th a t has potentially  
infringing uses, regardless of what other intended or unintended uses a technology could be 
put to. Already, provisions of the  Digital M illennium  Copyright Act have rem oved the  
enforcem ent of copyright from  the public sphere. This Act allows copyright enforcem ent 
through software controls th a t are them selves forbidden to be circum vented, regardless of 
w hether the  content controlled is protected by copyright. Copyright is about control; 
enforcing copyright as it is currently legislated will facilitate  control fa r m ore com prehensive  
than e ither copyright requires or political liberty can tolerate.
But powerful interests in cultural production face a threat from  technology tha t 
dem ocratizes cultural production and distribution; this th rea t is not m erely to  their business  
models but to  the false prem ises upon which the control they exercise is justified. The ease  
with which raw m aterial for creative processes can be obtained using netw ork technology  
and the  obviousness of the  ways in which creativity relies on such raw m aterial during digital 
m anipulation threaten  th e  rom antic notion of authorship often invoked by proponents of 
robust copyright protection. Similarly, th e  opportunity for unm ediated  com m unication  
offered by peer-to-peer networks -  on which any one node can com m unicate with any other 
by obeying sim ple, open protocols -  poses a th rea t to e laborately  fortified channels of
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distribution for cultural production th a t are the basis for m arket power. Copyright holders, 
then , are in a  fight for the  survival of the ir privileged position.
But this is not how the argum ent is fram ed. Instead, the argum ents for copyright 
center on the  artists who are suffering a t the hands of copyright infringing teenagers, of the  
self-sacrificing authors whose moral rights are violated by thieving youngsters. This paper 
sought to slice through the  rhetoric of copyright in an effort to discover a principled basis for 
understanding w hat an individual who generates a novel expression is entitled to. I have  
considered the best established rationales for property rights and believe there is a 
legitim ate claim th a t can be m ade by creators for a benefit from  the ir creations.
The benefit, however, m ust be understood for its costs and m ust be strictly lim ited to  
ensure th a t it does not grow beyond proportionality to th e  value created or establish m arket 
power hostile to vibrant discourse com m unities. This is how United States copyright was 
originally designed. Over the course of its history, however, copyright has expanded in scope 
and duration such th a t the  property rights it offers reflect nothing but the  naked interest of 
the powerful industries tha t have played such an im portant role in cultural production during 
the  past 1 0 0  years. There is no philosophical story th a t can explain copyright; only politics 
can explain the current state  of the  law.
It m ay be possible to reconstitute copyright as a justifiable system of property rights. 
A com pulsory licensing system for content traded over peer-to-peer networks would be a 
good first step. By prom oting the  proliferation and m odification of novel expression while 
providing a m ethod o f com pensating those who generate  novelty, compulsory licensing  
would clearly move copyright back to  its original purpose of prom oting a vibrant cultural 
sphere while encouraging individuals not merely to consum e w hat has been prepared for 
them  but to use and modify any expression th a t it seem s fit to rearrange.
Som e creators will doubtless object to seeing the  integrity o f their creations violated  
by other interests. W hether there  can be som e lim ited artist’s right to preserve th e  integrity
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of the ir creations seem s unclear, however if United States law regarding libel is any indicator, 
such a system would contravene im portant political liberties. The sim ple fact is tha t digital 
com puters connected by networks m ake the exchange of inform ation and the production of 
novelty easier than ever before. For som eone whose business depends on the preservation  
of scarcity, this is doubtless a frightening prospect. But rhetoric about the  rights of creators  
only obscures th e  logic of self-interest a t the  expense of public benefit th a t was copyright’s 
origin and tha t still generates so much of its content.
It m akes a good story but not one th a t holds up under philosophical scrutiny.
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